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THE ‘DEVELOPMENT APPROACH’ TO GOVERNANCE 
We, in Pakistan, should be very happy that the global development 
community has finally accepted the centrality of public sector reform (also known as 
improved governance) in the quest for improved living standards in poor countries. 
Development economics is a subject that is based on the interpretation and 
observation of some Western academics and Western donor-based agencies. We 
should have some sympathy for these leaders of development thought and policy for 
they have struggled with integrating the prevailing theme (fad) in Western thought 
and philanthropy with learning about the societies and economies that they were 
supposed to be prescribing for.  Using the principle of “ends justifying the means”, 
they defend their reliance on the current “fad” as well as on the only clearly visible, 
organised and powerful actor—the government, no matter how inefficient—they 
would. 
The result is that this approach led to a long era of government-led 
development, which centralised policy- and decision-making, initiated planning, 
and created a wide range of public-sector institutions. The role of the government 
was thus extended into areas that were conceptually indefensible. In this manner, 
the public servant grew into her new much more lustrous and looser robes. A 
bloated, over-centralised, and a private sector inhibiting government was created to 
be the observation and implementation outpost of the development word. This was 
the first step in the transformation of the public sector in the direction of 
misgovernance. 
The large, growing and domineering public sector while inhibiting growth and 
development was hungry for resources.  Reacting to the bloated public sector and the 
distortions that were thereby created, the distant leaders of policy and thought 
developed the “Washington Consensus.” The new buzzwords were “remove 
distortions”, “get the prices right”, “fiscal consolidation”, to be followed by 
“privatisation and internalisation.” Disjointed efforts at dismantling the earlier 
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planning structures and SOEs developed a fragmented public sector. Fiscal 
consolidation was achieved through sporadic efforts at expenditure reduction and 
revenue raising.  Since reducing public sector employment was politically risky, 
expenditure-reduction measures often relied on nominal wage freezes, which 
eventually translated into real wage cuts.  The public sector reacted to these strategic 
attacks on its recently expanded mandate in three ways: 
  • First, by slowing down reform in critical areas so that it’s grip on resources 
could be maintained;  
  • Second, by seeking alternative means to make up for the real wage cut that 
the public sector employees was experiencing.  Thus, “perks” —Legalised 
and non-transparent means of non-wage resource extraction—became a 
major form of civil-servant emoluments while the tolerance towards 
corruption significantly increased.  
  • Third, the more skilled, the less corrupt, as well as those seeking a more 
reform-oriented approach opted out of first the public sector and later, as 
opportunities shrank domestically, out of the country. 
The result was a bloated and fragmented public sector, which had rapidly lost 
skills and also developed a tolerance for corruption and inefficiency.  It is not 
surprising that in this milieu growth and investment slowed down sharply and 
perceptions of country risk increased sharply. What is surprising is the continued 
oblivion of all the main development thinkers and agencies of the West to the crying 
need to understand and prepare a strategy for a sound public sector reform.  
Development indicators measuring social and economic health have all 
remained fairly stubborn in the face of changing fads of development thinking and 
donor advice and funding. This frustration has lately led to interest in the catchall 
term—“governance”.  However, despite the adoption of the new term, reports and 
discussion on this subject either remains shallow or continues to define governance 
in traditional terms. The development thinker is still trying to obtain indicators of 
poverty, education and health to name a few.  The problems facing the people in 
many of these countries may be different. For example, a review of writings of the 
intelligentsia in countries such as Pakistan reveals that important problems that are 
leading to low levels of productivity and high perceptions of country risk are: 
  • poorly managed urban sprawls; 
  • rising crime rates; 
  • poor infrastructure;  
  • an extremely low quality of service provided by the public sector; and 
  • a distant centralised, overburdened, overbearing and predatory state. Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
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Ignoring this, the development-thinker has gone from saying that civil service 
reform is not important or something that can take place at a later stage of development 
to the stage of a belated recognition but then regarding it purely as a process or 
budgetary phenomenon. Hence their emphasis on downsizing, departmental 
closedowns, further centralisation of hiring and firing. You only have to review all the 
public sector work on developing countries to verify my claim.
1  Interestingly enough, 
through this process of learning and erosion of public sector efficiency, there has been 
no element of remorse or “mea culpa” from the development economist.  Adroitly, 
they are able to pass the blame entirely on to the poor countries.  But then poverty is a 
curse and the poor can do no good including think for themselves!   
Unfortunately while the development economist was learning, the 
intelligentsia of a country was being increasingly marginalised. The systems in 
developing countries were being rapidly corroded.  Their role was being totally 
denied in the development thinking and practice and by those who controlled 
resources or were in a position of influence.  In the thinking of the development 
theorist, reform was viewed as an exercise in retrenchment, accounting, and a set of 
laws and processes that can easily be defined through the long arm of the 
international consultant. Domestic human capital of the concerned country appears to 
play a limited role in this scheme of things. Sure there is a reference to weak 
incentives and the lack of domestic skills in the public sector, but the thrust of the 
argument remains that their reform can be entirely designed and driven by external 
thinking and human capital. 
Fortunately for the poor countries, the transformation of the former 
communist countries has drawn better economists into looking at issues of economic 
development and growth. We are, therefore, on the verge of some exciting new 
findings on public sector reform in developing countries using the principal-agent 
and asymmetric information paradigms. 
In this paper, I shall draw upon these developments in economic theory and 
country experience to show that a well-designed public sector reform must rely upon 
quality human capital of domestic origin, whether such human capital be available 
either at home or overseas.  Without the partnership of such human capital, neither 
can the reform be properly conceived nor can it be durably implemented! 
 
LEARNING FROM INCENTIVE AND 
ORGANISATION THEORY 
Much research has been conducted in the theory of incentives in organisations 
in the realm of neoclassical economics and this can be used to understand civil 
1See for example, the World Bank OED reports and the work by the public sector reform experts 
in the Bank.  There is some passing reference to the need for human resource management as well as 
possible wage compression. However, the emphasis is entirely on capacity building, transparency and 
accountability building a better legal framework, all of which are basically euphemisms for more technical 
assistance.  Domestic human capital and incentives for the use of it are not of interest. Nadeem Ul Haque 
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service reform. Basically these theoretical developments are based on two important 
paradigms: 
  • The fundamental point of departure for understanding any human behaviour 
is the recognition of selfishness that is inherent in all human actions. This 
viewpoint is fundamentally opposed to the commonly held view that derived 
from the 19th century liberal view, which saw the government as a 
benevolent protector of the poor. The public servant, as the name implies, 
was considered to be selfless, kind and caring, devoid of the need for worldly 
goods and desires.  Such angels would work for the common weal with no 
caring for family and the future!  Clearly this view is incompatible with the 
paradigm of selfishness. 
  • Information is costly to collect and that people may have different amounts 
of information available to them, which they will use to their advantage.  
This means that all exchange must now take into account the information 
asymmetries and the cost of obtaining information.  Public sector regulatory 
intervention is often required where informational asymmetries prevent the 
market from working.  However, this also gives selfish public servants an 
opportunity! 
  • This world of selfish individuals possessing asymmetric information leads to 
certain understandable forms of behaviour and certain approaches to 
analysing such behaviour have been developed.  
  • Moral Hazard (hidden action) when one party has the incentive to shift the 
risk onto another uninformed party. 
  • Adverse Selection (Hidden Information) when one party has more 
information about a market transaction. 
  • To deal with these issues, an analysis of contractual relationships, known 
as Agency Theory has been developed. An agency relationship is defined 
through an explicit or implicit contract in which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to take actions on behalf 
of the principal(s). The contract involves delegation of some decision-
making authority to the agent. Agency problems that emanate from 
conflicts of interests, which arise out of selfish behaviour in the presence 
of incomplete information, are common or endemic to most economic 
relationships. 
    Agency analysis has been used extensively to analyse how workers, 
managers, directors or investors respond to various incentives. Self interested 
economic agents can be motivated in roughly three ways: 
  • formal incentives such as piece rate wages, bonuses, stock options and 
relative performance evaluation are based on verifiable measures of 
performance;  Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
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  • foremen, fellow employees, bosses or boards of directors monitor work 
inputs; and  
  • career concerns inside and outside the firm may encourage a forward-
looking employee to exert more effort. 
The longest peacetime expansion in the US history owes a lot to these new 
developments in economic theory. Stock options, participation in the benefits of new 
discoveries in both monetary and non-monetary terms, and other clever contracting 
mechanisms have been designed to align incentives of managers and shareholders. 
They have led to an increase in the profitability of the US firms.  Such incentive-
based schemes drawn from the agency literature have also found their way into 
performance-based governance schemes. Examples of such schemes can now be 
found in countries such as New Zealand and the UK. As always, it takes a while for 
development theorists to catch up with serious economics since they are too busy 
following a diffuse agenda and patronising the poor. Consequently, agency theory 
has only recently begun to be used to understand public sector reform in developing 
countries.   
 
THE NEED FOR PROFESSIONALISATION 
AND DECENTRALISATION 
We live in a specialised world and there are limitations on the mental capacity 
of the human mind. The costs of producing and transferring knowledge prevent any 
single individual or a small body of experts to monopolise any form of decision-
making or expertise [Jensen and Meckling (1992)]. If knowledge valuable to a 
particular decision is to be used in making that decision there must be a system for 
partitioning out decision rights to individuals who already have the relevant 
knowledge and abilities or who can acquire or produce them at the lowest cost. 
Clearly, competent professionals who have incurred the costs of acquiring such 
knowledge as well as shown the inclination (and hence the comparative advantage) 
for it should be given the responsibility of taking such decisions. 
Because all individuals in a firm are self-interested, simply delegating decision 
rights to them and dictating the objective function that each is to maximise is not 
sufficient to accomplish the objective. A control system that ties the individual’s interest 
more closely to that of the organisation is required. The control system specifies:
2, 3 
2This control problem is solved in a capitalist economy by a system of alienable property rights. The 
inalienability of rights within an organisation means control problems must be solved by alternative means.  
3Specification of the performance measurement and evaluation system merely states the objective 
function. If the reality is different, self-interested individuals discover and understand the performance 
measures and evaluation system on which their rewards and punishments depend. Thus if the prevailing 
culture suggests that rewards lie in bribery and corruption which will not be checked, no amount of 
codification of good rules and procedures and exhortations for honesty will stop them from taking the 
more profitable route. Nadeem Ul Haque 
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  • the performance measurement and evaluation system for each subdivision of 
the firm and each decision agent (monitoring);  
  • the reward and punishment system that relates individual’s rewards to their 
performance. 
  • Job Mobility with better career possibilities inside and outside the firm 
encourages a forward-looking employee to exert more. 
  • There is neither guaranteed employment nor a guarantee of a promotion with 
seniority or age. Promotion is strictly on performance and subject to external 
competition.  At any level, an outsider can and will be brought in if such an 
appointment will help increase profits.   
The complexity of modern society and the specialisation required forces even 
firms to seek a decentralised form of management. Determining the optimal level of 
decentralisation requires balancing the costs of bad decisions owing to poor 
information and those owing to inconsistent objectives. In the extreme case of a 
completely centralised organisation the costs owing to poor information are high 
while the agency costs owing to inconsistent objectives are zero. The costs owing to 
poor information fall as the decision rights are delegated down to lower levels in the 
organisation. Assuming the usual convexities and continuity arguments, the optimal 
degree of decentralisation can be found to occur where the right is collocated with 
the specific knowledge relevant to the decision.
4 
Decentralisation often results in two widely used divisional performance 
measurement rules known as cost centers and profit centers. Cost centers are 
subdivisions that are directed to minimise the total cost of providing a specified 
quantity of service. Profit centers are more independent than cost centers; their 
budgets are more likely to be variable than those of cost centers. In general these 
centers place fewer knowledge demands on the CEO.  The key point to note is that 
such centers are often given considerable autonomy within an expectation of 
performance.  
 
THE “MULTINATIONAL” HAS LEARNT! 
Learning from “the theory of organisations” as outlined above, the 
multinationals, especially the American companies have built large and powerful 
global conglomerates. The empires are built on talent or the use of professionals, 
regardless of their origin. We all know of the contribution of the Pakistani talent to 
the development of global blue chip companies such as AST Computers, NEXGEN, 
Advanced Micro Devices, Citibank, American Home Products, Saudi American 
Bank, Bank of America, Ethan Allen to name a few.  In each of these companies 
4The optimal degree of decentralisation depends on factors like the size of the organisation, 
information technology (including computers, communications, and travel), the rate of change in the 
environment, government regulation, and the control technology. Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
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Pakistanis have played a pivotal role.  The multinational management has followed 
exactly the principles of incentive and organisation theory: 
  • They have created an atmosphere of professional meritocracy, by hiring the 
best professionals that they could find regardless of creed and offering them 
a lucrative and prestigious career. 
  •  Allowing these professionals a large degree of autonomy within a 
decentralised environment. 
  • They have held these professionals to high standards.  Performance is closely 
monitored.  
  H Good performance is generously rewarded through bonuses that in a short 
span of time make millionaires out of talented individuals; 
  H Bad performance is sharply penalised through instantaneous job loss as 
well as fervent prosecution of malfeasant behaviour; and 
  H Career advancement is purely talent-based. Talent and not age or seniority 
is the only criterion for advancement. 
It is interesting to note that through the application of these sound 
managerial principles that are firmly grounded in economic theory, corporations 
such as Citibank, Hoechst etc are able to pull record profits in distant locations. 
They do so through their decentralised system of management and often relying 
purely on local talent. In many of these countries governments are unable to 
draw upon this local talent because of their outmoded managerial and pay 
structures!  
 
RETHINKING PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM STRATEGY 
Development thinking continues to rely on the government to meet the 
challenges of progress. An important question that needs to be asked is “whether the 
government in its current oversized and corrupt form capable of leading any 
development activity?” Or is it likely that assigning new roles to the government will 
lead only to the rapid development of further means of seeking rents?   
As noted above, governments have clearly grown excessively and have 
developed a penchant for control and power. At the same time, if international 
ratings such as Transparency International, Business International Index and the 
ICRG are to be believed, maladministration and corruption have also increased. 
Meanwhile, human resource management in the government clearly leads to a 
poorly motivated public sector that does not attract quality human capital (see 




Attempts at reform must develop the view of an efficient government—one 
that in the most direct, clear and simple manner seeks to achieve a small number of 
well-defined social objectives.  The design of government must attempt to 
incorporate dynamic efficiency by trying to continuously improve its productivity 
by means of periodic public reviews of the functioning of the government 
activities.  
Clearly, any reform will have to conduct an audit of current government 
activities and institutions with a view to clarifying the need and objectives of all 
institutions. It should aim to eliminate the waste especially by closing down useless 
tasks and non-performing institutions. It should aim to bring government back to 
governing and not taking over the economy or the private sector.   
Reviewing the theory of organisations suggests some important principles of 
improving productivity in the government.   
Box 1 
Human resource management in Public Sectors in Developing Countries 
The public sector has traditionally been viewed merely as a transfer 
mechanism. The available evidence on wage, employment and human capital 
policies in the public sector wages suggests the following stylised facts: 
  1. Poor public sector incentives for attracting talent: 
  • Public wages have declined in real terms over time in many developing 
countries  
  • Declines in real wages have been larger in poor countries 
  • At the senior levels, the private sector wage is much higher than the 
public sector wage, while the opposite is true at the lower levels. 
  • There is considerable wage compression: Wages at upper levels of 
public administration have often been reduced by more than those at the 
lower levels.  
  • The wage declines have been accompanied by an increase in perks and 
other non-wage benefits that are not only harder to monitor but provided 
at a higher cost than the value or benefit that the recipient derives. 
  • Corruption and maladministration increases with declining real wages.  
  2. Stabilisation programmes affect fiscal adjustments often through declines 
in real wages in the public sector.  
  3. Civil services in poor countries are typically hierarchical, unified, closed 
and non-meritocratic structures 
  4. Donor-led CSR efforts thus far have not yielded any success 
See Haque and Aziz 1999 for details Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
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  • An important change that needs to be made is that of reviewing the 
recruitment and use of human capital in the key area of governance. This 
would mean a careful market-based review of cash remuneration.  For 
without that, productivity in government will not be increased, nor will the 
civil servant be motivated to carry through the reform. The current system of 
remunerating government servants results in strong incentives to corruption 
as individuals with less education and increased proclivity to be corrupt opt 
for such service.  
  • A smaller government more efficient and professionally staffed government 
should seek talent from everywhere. Like all other markets, the market for 
government jobs should also be subjected to external competition.   
Recruitment should be continuously conducted at all levels and not 
dependant on one exam only.  As much as possible cross flow between 
management from the private sector to the public sector should be 
encouraged.  Mobility should be strongly encouraged. 
  • Career concerns are an important source of incentives for productivity and 
good behaviour. Automatic promotions based on service period or seniority 
with no evaluation of productivity should be abandoned. Clear, well 
publicised productivity guidelines, which are easily monitorable, should be 
established for public positions.  
  • Emphasis should be placed on the development of institutional autonomy 
and hard budget constraints. Decentralised decision-making and 
autonomous cost and profit centers are among the important factors 
contributing to the strength of the corporate world and should be adopted in 
the government too. 
 
BUILDING CAPACITY: HUMAN CAPITAL FLIGHT 
VS. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
While public sectors have been oriented towards wage compression, and 
economies have been growing slowly, the optimal response of those with skills, 
was to migrate. We have a fair amount of evidence on  brain drain suggesting that 
there may be a talent pool that poor countries could draw from [see Table 3 and 
Haque and Aziz (1999)]. Given the relatively short supply of skills in these 
countries, even non-spectacular numbers appear to have consequences for 
institutional capacity. Haque and Kim (1995) show that there is an output and 
income loss with the migration of skills.  
A standard approach to dealing with the issue of loss or lack of scarce skills is 
the provision of technical assistance. International agencies and bilateral donors such 
as United States Agency for International Development use this approach 
extensively. Skills that are scarce in a developing economy are provided by short-
term expatriate advisers, typically at compensation levels higher than those Nadeem Ul Haque 
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prevailing in international markets.
5 This is to compensate for undertaking the 
hardship of moving from metropolitan centers.  The high cost of technical assistance 
is justified since it is expected that institutional development will be encouraged as 
the human capital input of technical assistance can galvanise a modern system in a 
short span of time. Once the system has been set in motion, the local human capital 
can maintain it at the low salary structure prevalent domestically.   
Most countries that utilise technical assistance experience a substantial 
amount of brain drain. For equity and other considerations, the technical assistance 
model prevents the migrants from a country to return as part of technical assistance. 
Any person who has been a part of the brain drain can only return home at the low 
domestic salary and not at the technical assistance level of emoluments. The UN has 
actually mandated a salary structure in their offices that are situated in developing 
countries. Bear in mind that the UN local office jobs in many of these countries are 
among the more coveted. The structure of the professional policymaking/social 
science labour market is as follows: the lowest paid jobs are in the public sector; 
locally the UN jobs are preferred; and should the person be willing to move, 
headquarters jobs are desirable. It is not surprising then that the public sector lacks 
skills. What is surprising is that the question of the costs and benefits of the 
alternative channels of brain drain repatriation and technical assistance for 
institutional development in developing countries, which should be of obvious 
interest, are seldom studied. 
Suppose, as is usually the case, that skilled workers have already migrated. In 
this case, the comparison needs to be made between attracting an expatriate and a 
resident of the higher income country.  However, Haque and Khan (1997) have 
shown that for the same compensation, technical assistance programmes will attract 
higher skilled migrants than experts from a higher income country.
6  Consequently, 
technical assistance cannot be a substitute for the approach being proposed here—a 
comprehensive reform of the civil service that fully utilises domestic talent.
7  
 
REFORM OF THE PAKISTAN CIVIL SERVICE 
Reportedly, misadministration and corruption in Pakistan are high.  Given the 
current level of wastage, we have a management problem and not a resource 
problem.  It is widely believed that the current system is elitist without being 
professional.  Learning from organisation theory, the following can be suggested: 
5Typically, technical assistance is made available in areas of public sector responsibility such as 
institutional weaknesses.  In such areas, the public sector rigidly maintains an uncompetitive wage 
structure [see Haque and Sahay (1996) and Haque and Kim (1995)].  Frequently, policy intervention of 
donors, especially for short term stabilisation, results in a reduction of public sector wages [See Kraay and 
Van Rijckeghem (1995)]. 
6For proofs of proposition 6 and 7, see Haque and Khan (1998) and Haque and Aziz (1999). 
7A piecemeal approach to reform based on technical assistance can, in certain cases, lead to 
unbalanced development and less than durable solutions. For example, the “enclave” approach has been 
used for quick results. Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
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  • Pay-scales Must be Attractive Enough to Compete for Quality.  The current 
system of remunerating government servants results in (a) strong incentives 
to corruption and (b) in the induction of individuals with less education and 
more incentives to be corrupt in to the service.
8 Salary scales must be set to 
attract the required human capital to be attracted to public service. This 
means, departing from the notions of dedicated public service and moving 
towards a system of market-based salaries within government.
9 As in many 
countries, such a policy would also mean decompression of pay scales and 
hence the tolerance of greater inequality in government.   
  • Performance-based Remuneration Must be Transparent and in Cash. The 
bulk of the civil servant’s salary should be only in cash.  The government 
should not be in the business of managing houses and cars.  These perks are 
often abused and consequently, impose a heavier a burden on the budget than 
salaries alone would.  Unfortunately, no study has been done of the cost to 
the taxpayer of maintaining these perks.  Nevertheless, we can easily assume 
that cars are maintained by the government at greater expense and have a 
shorter life than those in the private sector. 
  • Greater Mobility and Openness to External Competition:  The current closed 
shop system should be closed down and replaced by a new system that relies 
on open recruitment of the best people from all over given the spread of 
Pakistanis in the world.  Recruitment should be continuously conducted at all 
levels and not dependant on one exam only.  As much as possible cross flow 
between private management from the private sector to the public sector 
should be encouraged.  Conflict of interest issues will arise but they will be 
no worse than today where the system is rife with corruption.  Selection of 
good professionals through open and transparent means: Open recruitment 
should be conducted at all levels from among all available competent 
professionals and not just those in the government.  Such appointments 
should be subject to some form of scrutiny of the public.  For example 
parliament or parliamentary committees could confirm senior positions like 
secretaries after open hearings and expert witnesses. 
  • Develop Performance-based, and not Seniority-based, Careers: Automatic 
promotions based on service seniority with no evaluation of productivity should 
be abandoned. Clear, well-publicised productivity guidelines, which are easily 
monitorable, should be established for public positions. Periodic public reporting 
on progress and performance indicators should be mandatory.  Individual and 
departmental responsibility could also be enforced with some citizen’s or the 
8It is now widely rumored that the high scorers on the civil service are now opting for Customs 
Service as opposed to the traditional District Management Group or the Foreign Service.   
9The current low salaries are creating a virtual acceptance of corruption.  What is worse, once 
corruption acquires acceptability, candidates with better educational background and consequently less 
prone to corruption are less likely to offer themselves for government service. Nadeem Ul Haque 
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elected representative’s collaboration.  For example senior bureaucrats could 
present annual reports of their department activities to parliament or 
parliamentary committees allowing media coverage for public information.
10  
  • Career Streams and Institutional Autonomy: Perhaps the single largest factor 
that is constraining the flow of human capital into government is the unified 
National Pay Scales (NPS).  These grades have established the relative price 
of doctors, lawyers, economists, engineers, market regulators etc. and have 
locked them very rigidly against each other.  Thus, for example, a Nobel 
laureate like Salam can only be a grade 20 professor in his own profession of 
research and academics while a civil servant who was successful in his exam 
30 years ago will be two grades above him in grade 22.  Similarly, a world 
famous neurosurgeon like Ayub Umayyia cannot aspire beyond grade 20 in 
his own field. The professionally qualified also recognise that 
professionalism is only capable of taking them upto grade 20, and attempt 
very quickly to work their way into the political, non-professional world to 
make their way to health secretary, secretary energy etc.
11, 12 
Uniformity and Egalitarian Policies Favouring Large Centralised Governments 
are Outmoded. No system anywhere in the world locks local government, provincial 
administration and the federal government into rigid hierarchy as the Pakistani 
system does. The NPS clearly specify that the functionaries at all levels in the local 
administration are paid less and fall lower on the NPS scales than those of the 
provincial government and the latter are at a lower level on the NPS than the federal 
officials. Thus, for example, the provincial secretary is a grade 20 official the 
equivalent of a federal joint secretary. The establishment of such a hierarchy means 
that the local levels can really not compete for human capital of independent 
decision-making with the federal government.  
  • More Autonomous Professional Institutions with Hard Budget Constraints 
should be Established. Regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Power Regulatory Agency, and service 
10Job performance would be monitored by the mechanisms suggested above.  However, they 
should be supplemented with regular and intensive training activities.  Such an approach as well as offers 
from other sectors will automatically throw up the good officers who may or may not be promoted 
depending on external competition. 
11This has been most harmful to education where all professors and teachers have been relegated 
to a position that is inferior to that of administrators who not only get paid better but are also in charge of 
resources.  A university professor is valued less than university administrators and bureaucrats. Professors 
therefore have no incentive to hone their skills in their subject; instead they vie for administration jobs 
such as the vice chancellor. The quality of teaching has, as a result, suffered and less and less of the truly 
qualified teachers are offering themselves for teaching positions. 
12Responding to the incentives of the political system, the professionally qualified are prepared to 
trade their professional competence for a political appointment.  In this way we have lost many a capable 
doctor, lawyer, economist and engineer to the political maneuverer-cum- bureaucrat. What is worse is that 
the incentives are set for the young to not specialise in a profession and towards political maneuvering. Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
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provision agencies, such as educational and health provision institutions are 
prime candidates for such autonomisation.  Such autonomisation could be 
based on two principles: 
  • As far as possible these autonomous agencies have to be subjected to 
supervision through boards of directors that are rooted in their clientele—
the people who demand their services.  Often the government retaining 
enough residual control to interfere in the organisation washes out such 
autonomisation attempts. This is through the government control of boards 
and the hiring and firing including the tenure of the CEOs of such 
agencies.  Rather than have a public services commission that attempts to 
ensure that equality in recruitment is maintained across all institutions, 
perhaps an alternative commission might be set up to investigate and make 
public the performance of such autonomous agencies. 
  • Financing should only be provided based on the achievement of clearly 
stated objectives.  Managers of those institutions should be very seriously 
held accountable for the management of the finances of the institution and 
the meeting of the objectives of the institution.  They should be forced to 
public audits and be subjected to a public examination annually.  In such a 
system, we will see that the managers will have to value professionals and 
not treat them like second class citizens.
13 
  • Performance should be Monitored and Non-performance and Malfeasance 
should be Penalised.  
 
THE NEED TO RETAIN DOMESTIC HUMAN CAPITAL 
We must not move along without paying tribute to some of the local talent 
that even in these adverse circumstances chooses not to migrate.  However, those 
that remain for their own reasons are scattered and overworked, and frequently 
unable to retain their professional edge.
14 Whatever remains of governance and 
administration often falls on the few skilled individuals who stay in the civil service.  
Professions rarely exist in any serious manner in these countries. Those with skill 
who have not migrated often do not have the resources to do any serious independent 
work. More often than not, the only choice open to them is work for the local branch 
of the donor office in a junior position.   
The question arises, “how is policy analysis and formulation conducted in 
such an environment?”  The answer is that it becomes the responsibility of the 
international agency by default. All information on socio-economic development in 
13Managers should have clear tenures and depart once their tenure is over. The current system of 
high turnover or exceptionally long tenures is harmful to institutional development.  At the initial stages 
especially, every effort should be made to recruit managers from the non-government and private sector. 
14Under-funded and low quality universities serve to drive away good faculty rather than develop 
any critical masses of serious academics in their departments.  Nadeem Ul Haque 
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these countries is to be found in the reports of these agencies. Domestically, there are 
no more than a handful who understand these issues and reports, and they are heavily 
involved in the negotiations and the work of the international agencies. Few, apart 
from them have access to much of this information. The debate on the issues is 
restricted to the staff of the international agency and the senior technocratic officials 
with the former having the luxury of the time and resources to actually conduct 
serious inquiry. The latter, being in such short supply and spread thinly over the 
many administrative functions of the country can, at best, act as informed 
discussants.    
Policy ideas originate in donor and international agency offices and are 
transmitted to the government.  Between these two groups decisions are taken. At 
times, a limited effort is made through a seminar to inform concerned people of the 
findings. There are two important limitations of approach: 
  • First, policy initiatives have limited local input or participation and hence 
may not be fully in consonance with local problems.  Hence it is easier to 
follow the “fad” in the west rather than learn about what is needed 
domestically. 
  • Second, there is limited domestic ownership of a product whose origins lie 
overseas. It is no wonder then that serious efforts at privatisation and 
downsizing of government were resisted for a long time at considerable cost 
to the country.  Often when these ideas are implemented, they are often 
resisted locally or nullified through lackluster implementation. 
Surprisingly, the current approach to policy formulation has not been 
examined using the incentive framework.  Are the interests of the governments and 
the donors always in consonance with those of the people? Are the donors who 
formulate policy always fully informed?  Where is the quality check?  How is 
accountability enforced? It is hard to see how mistakes in making policy are even 
discovered in the current approach. There is little serious review or criticism of the 




Haque, Nadeem Ul, and Jahangir Aziz (1999) The Quality of Governance: ‘Second-
Generation’ Civil Service Reform in Africa. Journal of African Economies 8:  
(AERC Supplement) 68–106. 
Haque, Nadeem Ul and Ratna Sahay (1996) Do Government Wage Cuts Close 
Budget Deficits? Costs of Corruption. IMF Staff Papers 43:4  754–78. 
Haque, Nadeem Ul, and M. Ali Khan (1997) Institutional Development: Skill 
Transference Through a Reversal of Human Capital Flight or Technical 
Assistance. (IMF Working Paper WP/97/89.) Human Resource Management and Public Sector Reform 
 
485
Haque, Nadeem Ul, and Mahmood Hasan Khan (1998) The Economics Profession in 
Pakistan: A Historical Analysis. The Pakistan Development Review 37:4  431–52. 
Haque, Nadeem Ul, and Se-jik Kim (1995) Human Capital Flight: Impact of 
Migration on Income and Growth. September. (IMF Staff Papers.) 
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling (1992) Specific and General 
Knowledge, and Organisational Structure. In Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander 
(eds) Contract Economics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Kraay, Aart, and Caroline Van Rijckeghem (1995) Employment and Wages in the 
Public Sector—A Cross-country Study. International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D. C. (IMF Working Paper, WP/95/.)  
Comments 
 
Let me first of all congratulate the author for presenting a useful professional 
paper with conceptual and theoretical rigor. More importantly, the subject matter of 
the paper is extremely germane to the public sector and civil service matters in the 
present Pakistani contest. The paper provides deep insight into the urgent and dire 
need to introduce an incentive-oriented civil service reform particularly if the 
government is serious about improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public 
sector. Let me recall the author’s quote from the authoritarian but visionary, 
forward-looking former Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew: “if you 
pay peanuts, what you get is monkey”. This was said over three decades ago and 
this, in a nutshell, summarises the so-called “incentive-oriented civil service reform”. 
Mr Lee Kuan Yew fully implemented his views and, as a result, the Prime Minister’s 
current annual salary in Singapore is US$ 1.94 million, which is five times more 
than the salary of the President of the United States. This sort of salary structure 
does not stop at the highest level but also permeates throughout the bureaucratic set-
up. 
We now turn to the author’s view in a more theoretical perspective. In his 
paper, he refers to the role of government and governance in growth models. Here 
the critical question is: What exactly is the role of these non-economic variables in 
an economic growth model? In the traditional neoclassical growth models developed 
by Robert Solow and Trevor Swan in the 1950s, the output of an economy grows in 
response to larger inputs of capital and labour (all physical inputs). Non-economic 
variables have no function in these models. Furthermore, the economy under such a 
model conforms to the law of diminishing returns to scale. With these assumptions, 
the neoclassical growth models afford some implications to the economy; 
particularly that as the capital stock increases, growth of the economy slows down, 
and in order to keep the economy growing it must capitalise from incessant infusions 
of technological progress. It is well-known that this type of mechanism in the 
neoclassical growth model is neither inherent nor does it strive to explain much; in 
economic lexicon, this simply means that the technological progress is “exogenous” 
to the system. Yet the reality is quite contrary to that, particularly for the East Asian 
economies, where the economies kept growing for well over two and a half decades. 
This implies that it is not only technology which is the main driving force 
accountable for maintaining such high growth performance in these economies, but 






Addressing the above issues, in the mid-1980s, a new paradigm was 
developed in the literature, mostly due to the Paul Romer (1986), which is now 
commonly known as the “endogenous growth models”. By broadening the concept 
of capital to include human capital, the new endogenous growth model argues that 
the law of the diminishing-returns-to-scale phenomenon may not be true as is the 
case for East Asian economies. In simple terms, what this means is that if the firm 
which invests in capital also employs educated and skilled workers, then not only 
will the labour be productive but it will also be able to use the capital and technology 
more efficiently. This will lead to a “Hicks-neutral” shift in the production function 
and thus there can be increasing rather than decreasing returns to investments. In 
other words, technology and human capital are both “endogenous” to the system. 
Indeed the advent of the “endogenous growth models” with human capital 
(providing externalities) have certainly enhanced the understanding of the mysteries 
of rapid and long sustainable high growth performance of East Asian economies for 
non-economists; however, both theories seem to be deficient in one important 
imperative, which is government or government policies—these are all non-
economic factors. In fact, Robert Barro (1995) and Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew 
Warner (1995) have found in their large sample empirical studies that nations with 
good, transparent government policies and small governments along with educated 
human capital tend to grow faster than the ones where these elements are missing. 
Here, I should point out that governance and civil service reform are an integral part 
of government policies. So what I am arguing here is that it is not only the economic 
variables that are relevant and important, but that there are other, non-economic 
variables mentioned above which are equally important in explaining the high 
growth phenomenon. And it is from this perspective that I believe the author is 
trying to emphasise and explain the governance issue. 
The author has also raised another important issue in terms of the 
inefficiencies of the civil service, and its remuneration structure at least from the 
perspective of economic theory. In basic economic theory, under perfect 
competition, to ensure efficiency and maximisation of output, one needs to ensure 
that the workers’ remuneration or real wage rate should be equal to its marginal 
productivity. However, if the public sector, which acts as a monopsonist, at the 
margin offers real wages to its civil servants that are not in conformity with their 
respective marginal productivity, then this may lead to building distortions and 
inefficiencies into the system. If the public sector insists and continues to offer rigid 
wages not in line with the workers’ marginal productivity, or if it pays far below the 
competitive wages, then the consequences of such rigid non-competitive wages will 
eventually lead to readjustments in the marginal productivities of the workers. Thus, 
in this type of non-competitive system, there will be an exodus of efficient and M. Aynul Hasan  488 
qualified civil servants from the low-paid public sector. Eventually, these workers 
will be replaced by inefficient and, probably, corrupt civil servants. 
Another important issue related to the building of human capital is that it has 
a long gestation period. While with additional capital, technology, and labour it is 
possible to reduce the gestation period of an economic investment activity (such as a 
road-building project or a dam project), the same cannot be said about social sector 
investment, particularly that of education. If there is a 10-year school programme to 
produce graduates, then by pouring in more resources one may perhaps improve the 
quality of graduates; but so far as the gestation period is concerned this cannot be 
changed. So the human capital issue is a long-term proposition, and governments 
will have to address this issue from that point of view. 
In the end, I would again commend the author for raising such an important 
issue of the public sector which deserves immediate attention of the policy-makers 
and the government, if they are serious about introducing meaningful reforms in the 
country. 
 
M. Aynul Hasan 
UN-Economic and Social Commission 
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